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I. INTRODUCTION 
Roughly six percent of our nation’s electricity is generated by 
hydroelectric plants, with a considerable amount of that 
generation occurring at federal facilities.1 Today, hydroelectric 
                                                             
 * Winston S. Howard, Distinguished Professor, University of Wyoming College of 
Law. I would like to thank A. Dan Tarlock and James E. Hickey, Jr. for their helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
 1. See generally KELSI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HYDROPOWER: 
FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL INVESTMENT (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42579.pdf 
(discussing numbers in 2014). In February 2016, the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) projected that hydroelectric generation would increase by approximately 5% in 2016 as 
a consequence of higher water levels attributable to El Nino. PERRY LINDSTROM & TYLER 
HODGE, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TODAY IN ENERGY: ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM 
RENEWABLE SOURCES EXPECTED TO GROW 9% THIS YEAR (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=24792. Yet, in 2015, the difference in total 
wind and conventional hydroelectric power generation was only about 60,000 thousand 
megawatt hours, with wind generation gaining about 20,000 megawatt hours a year since 
2007. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY: TABLE 1.1A NET GENERATION 
FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES: TOTAL (ALL SECTORS), 2006-AUGUST 2016 (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_01_a. 
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power enjoys the seemingly envious position of producing what the 
industry claims is clean energy. Yet, it provokes a level of 
controversy possibly second only to that of energy produced from 
coal-fired plants. For some, hydroelectric energy “is not cheap and 
clean but costly and damaging.”2 And whether it offers a promise 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions at little other 
environmental cost remains a lively topic.3 For others, it offers 
unique opportunities for stabilizing grid operations—providing 
such benefits as peaking power (quickly accessible energy to meet 
high demand periods during the day), reserve generation, and 
balancing. While the era of constructing large dams is long past—
and, indeed, effectively vanished in the 1970s with the emergence 
of the environmental movement and President Carter’s “hit” list 
for large federal water projects4—few believe that many of the 
existing large hydroelectric dams will be removed.5 The latest 
struggle to remove dams along the Klamath River is a testament 
to the challenges of removal.6 This same dialogue is unfolding on 
                                                             
 2. TIM PALMER, LIFELINES: THE CASE FOR RIVER CONSERVATION 61 (1994). 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel Cusick, Hydro: An Answer to Climate Change or a “False 
Solution”?, E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (July 25, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060040720/feed. 
 4. President Carter portrayed large dams as wasteful and environmentally 
unsound. See, e.g., Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Water Resource Projects—Statement 
Announcing Administration Decisions (Apr. 18, 1977), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7364; Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., 
Federal Water Policy Message to Congress (June 6, 1978), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30912; see also United Press Int’l, 
President Carter’s Project Hit List: Bitter Conflicts Surround Any Water Project, LODI NEWS-
SENTINEL,14, (May 18, 1977). 
 5. See generally Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641 
(1999). 
 6. See generally HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH 
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS (2008). See also Thomas P. 
Schlosser, Dewatering Trust Responsibility: The New Klamath River Hydroelectric and 
Restoration Agreements, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 42 (2011); Michael A. Swiger & Sharon 
L. White, Rebuttal in Defense of the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, 2 WASH. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 297 (2011). After Congress failed to fund the settlement, the Obama 
administration in early 2016 agreed with the primary settlement parties that they would try 
to jointly secure approval to remove the dams from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission. See Bettina Boxall, Klamath River Dams Moving Toward Removal Despite 
Congressional Barriers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
klamath-river-dams-20160203-story.html. Most recently, California is in the process of 
studying the benefits of removing the San Clemente Dam. See Calif. Learns Lessons As Dam 
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the international level as well.7 And so today, as hydroelectric 
projects built decades ago continue to operate and secure 
necessary, subsequent relicenses to operate, it is worth considering 
the continued role of hydroelectric generation as well as the 
historical and regulatory context surrounding that emerging role. 
After all, several older projects recently demonstrated how 
licensees can settle long-standing disputes surrounding a project 
by either including a nearby Native American tribe in the project’s 
                                                             
Falls, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2016/03/07/stories/1060033546. Benefits from removing the 
dam in the Elwha watershed have proved successful. See After World’s Largest Dam Removal, 
Elwha Watershed Thriving, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2016/02/16/stories/1060032443. See Adell L. Amos, Dam 
Removal and Hydropower Production in the United States—Ushering in a New Era, 29 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2014) (presenting an overview of the dam removal question); see also 
Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency 
Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81 (2001); Dan Tarlock, The 
Legal-Political Barriers to Ramping Up Hydro, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259 (2010); Gina S. 
Warren, Hydropower: It’s A Small World After All, 91 NEB. L. REV. 925 (2013). For an 
interesting alternative to just removing dams, Dave Owen and Collin Apse present an 
innovative trading concept. See Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1043 (2015). 
 7. See Howard Schneider, World Bank Turns to Hydropower to Square Development 
with Climate Change, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/world-bank-turns-to-hydropower-to-
square-development-with-climate-change/2013/05/08/b9d60332-b1bd-11e2-9a98-
4be1688d7d84_story.html; Coco Liu, Climate Change Evaporates Part of China’s Hydropower 
Production, E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059956097. In Brazil, as of June 2014, hydroelectric power 
provided over 75% of that nation’s electric energy. KEVIN LILLIS, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
TODAY IN ENERGY: HYDROPOWER SUPPLIES MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF BRAZIL’S 
ELECTRIC POWER (June 17, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16731; see 
also Vanessa Dezem, Brazil Narrows Budget Gap with $4.5 Billion Hydropower Action, 
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
24/brazil-sets-rules-for-4-6-billion-hydropower-auction. However, the effects of climate change 
and the potential for increasing droughts have threated hydroelectric development. See Jan 
Rocha, Brazil Eyes Solar as Drought Squeezes Hydropower Resources, CLIMATE HOME: NEWS 
(June 4, 2014), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/04/06/brazil-eyes-solar-as-drought-
squeezes-hydropower-resources/. And a recent study suggests that Brazil’s dams “pose an 
extinction threat for thousands of species.” Dams Threaten Species, Ecosystems in Amazon-
Study, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2016/03/21/stories/1060034338. 
4 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
revenue stream or, even, turning over facility ownership to a tribe.8 
Additionally, the Obama administration included expanding 
hydroelectric generation at existing dams as a component of the 
2013 Climate Action Plan.9 
This essay, therefore, briefly reviews the history surrounding 
the development of our modern regulatory regime governing 
hydroelectric generation. Part II chronicles the forces animating 
the passage of the nation’s first energy legislation—the 1920 
Federal Water Power Act. Part III then explores, briefly, how 
hydroelectric generation became subsumed within the nation’s 
evolving environmental consciousness throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, effectively ending any potential capacity for significant 
expansion. Part IV selectively surveys some recent notable 
changes to the regulatory program for hydroelectric generation.10 
This essay concludes that efforts to reform the regulatory program 
for hydroelectric generation will undoubtedly continue, and that, 
quite possibly, technological advances might someday transform 
the generation resource—with the principal question being: 
whether any such advances retard or promote its continuation? 
II. THE GENESIS OF THE 1920 FEDERAL WATER POWER 
ACT 
Our modern energy grid first evolved as the nation witnessed 
how water could be harnessed to produce electric energy. Early on, 
falling water helped promote early industrialization efforts, 
                                                             
 8. Montana Tribe Takes Control of Dam Within Reservation Boundary, INDIANZ 
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/09/09/montana-tribe-takes-control-
of.asp?print=1. 
 9.  
The Administration is also taking steps to encourage the development of 
hydroelectric power at existing dams. To develop and demonstrate 
improved permitting procedures for such projects, the Administration will 
designate the Red Rock Hydroelectric Plant on the Des Moines River in 
Iowa to participate in its Infrastructure Permitting Dashboard for high-
priority projects.  
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 7 (June 2013). 
 10. For instance, this essay does not address alternative forms of hydrokinetic 
energy. 
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particularly in the northeast.11 By the late 1800s, federal 
legislation began to sanction and encourage hydroelectric power.12 
After the Civil War, Congress passed individual statutes 
authorizing private development along navigable waters. This, of 
course, paralleled the nation’s policy of making public lands 
available for disposition to state or private actors willing profit 
from use of the land.13 In 1879, for example, the secretary of war 
was “authorized and empowered to lease the water power” to the 
Moline Water Power Company.14 Five years later, Congress 
awarded the Saint Cloud Water Power & Mill Co. the right to 
develop water power from the Mississippi River.15 Congress also 
began delegating authority to the secretary of war to grant 
development rights.16 By 1896, for instance, Congress allowed sales 
                                                             
 11. See PATRICK M. MALONE, WATERPOWER IN LOWELL: ENGINEERING AND INDUSTRY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); see also LOOMIS HAVEMEYER, CONSERVATION OF 
OUR NATURAL RESOURCES: BASED ON VAN HISE’S THE CONSERVATION OF OUR NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 175–76 (1937) (discussing history and suggesting that it 
was erratic). 
 12. The first turbines emerged around the late 1820s, yet not until 1849 did James 
Francis design the modern turbine. Reportedly, Wisconsin housed the first operational 
hydroelectric plant in the United States, in the 1870s. By 1900, however, Niagara Falls already 
had become the site of a commercial system. See generally LOUIS C. HUNTER, WATERPOWER: A 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1930 292–342 (1979); see also 
JOHN BAUER ET AL., THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY: DEVELOPMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND 
PUBLIC POLICIES 24–44 (1939); DUNCAN HAY, PREPARED FOR EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, 
HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1940 1–132 (1991). 
 13. See generally BENJAMIN H. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 
(1965). 
 14. Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 182, 20 Stat. 377. 
 15. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 229, 23 Stat. 133. 
 16. Congress granted the Secretary of War authority to grant rights for waterpower 
development along the Muskingum River, Ohio. Act of Aug. 11, 1888, ch. 860, 25 Stat. 400, 
417. In 1890 Congress also authorized the Secretary of War to grant waterpower privileges 
along the Green and Barron Rivers.  Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426, 447. This 
authority included the ability to establish rates: 
The Secretary of War is hereby authorized and empowered grant leases 
or licenses for the use of the water-powers on the Green and Barren 
Rivers at such a rate and on such conditions and for such periods of time 
as may seem to him just, equitable, and expedient; said leases not to 
exceed the period of twenty years: Provided, That the leases or licenses 
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of electric power from rights of way on public lands.17 Congress also 
passed various rivers and harbors statutes,18 culminating in the 
1899 Rivers and Harbors Act.19 
Following the turn of the century, several salient factors 
coalesced and propelled hydroelectric generation onto the national 
stage. To begin with, although hydroelectric generation fueled our 
increasing manufacturing economy prior to the Civil War, steam 
generation became a favored energy source because of 
demographic and economic changes in the post-Civil War period.20 
People and manufacturing moved toward the cities, while both 
steam and electric railways made these centers of the new 
consumer economy more accessible. 21 However, the cities were 
often too far from where a hydroelectric plant could be located, 
since transmission lines at the time were only capable of running 
less than a few hundred miles.22 Plants a little further from cities, 
however, became more feasible once George Westinghouse pushed 
the industry toward the use of alternating current (AC) 
transmission lines, which could cover long distances.23 And before 
the end of the century, the Willamette Falls Electric Company 
transmitted 3,000 volts “from Oregon City to Portland, fourteen  
                                                             
shall be limited to the use of the surplus water not required for 
navigation. 
Id. Congress, also, protected any existing waterpower rights along the rivers, and directed that 
any received money be deposited into the Treasury. Id. 
  17. Act of May 14, 1896, ch. 179, 29 Stat. 120. 
 18. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426. 
 19. River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121. 
 20. LOUIS C. HUNTER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1780-1930 485–541 (1979). 
 21. The original concept of a central station suffered from the ability and cost 
associated with transporting power more than a few miles. THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF 
POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY 83 (3rd prtg. 1993). 
 22. Id. 
 23. In 1891, a project in Frankfurt, Germany demonstrated “not only the potential of 
using distant water-power sites to supply electricity to heavily populated industrial areas but 
also the suitability of polyphase systems for long-distance power transmission.” Id. at 129. 
Serious efforts to explore tapping Niagara Falls didn’t occur until late 1889, and the 
achievement in Frankfurt assisted in “persuad[ing] the engineers to support electric 
transmission to Buffalo.” Id. at 137, 139. 
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miles away.”24 One of engineering consulting firm Stone & 
Webster’s first projects, in 1890, was to design a transmission 
system from the Saccrappa Dam along the Presumpscot River, in 
Maine, to a mill “a mile away.”25 It would not be until after the 
1930s, however, when transmission lines could carry power from a 
water resource beyond 300 miles away.26 
The national dialogue over hydroelectric generation 
germinated throughout the first decade of the twentieth century. 
To begin with, Congress passed the “revocable permit law” in 1901, 
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue rights of way 
across public lands and other reservations for, among other things, 
facilities related to electrical power.27 Of course, by this time many 
power-sites already had become patented and under private 
control.28 The following year, Congress passed the 1902 
                                                             
 24. F.A.T. Furfari, Westinghouse and the AC System—1884-1895, 8 IEEE INDUS. 
APPLICATIONS MAG. 8, 10 (2002); see also HAVEMEYER, supra note 11, at 176 (transmission “in 
effect permitted the water power to be brought from the remote mountain region down into 
the busy city”). 
 25. SAM BASS WARNER, JR., PROVINCE OF REASON 55 (1984) (“At that time the 
transmission of electric power had not yet been mastered, but the young men [Stone and 
Webster] succeeded in devising a workable 500-volt direct current system, which they later 
experimented with and improved.). Later, the two would work on many of the larger projects, 
including three dams near Freson, California and a 275-mile transmission that would carry 
power to Los Angeles. Id. at 59. But it was the 1913 Keokuk dam in Iowa, the largest water-
power facility before WWI, that would establish the company’s prominence. Id. 
 26. Transmission capacity reportedly was “limited to 200 or 300 miles. This means 
that hydroelectric energy must be consumed relatively near-by its place of production, and 
that the probable nearby market is as much (or more) of a factor in considering development 
as the physical factors of the area.” A.E. PARKINS & J.R. WHITAKER, OUR NATURAL RESOURCES 
AND THEIR CONSERVATION 314 (1936). In 1918, for instance, a Westinghouse Electric official 
testified that transmission then could carry energy up to 200 miles.  Water Power: Hearings 
Before the H. Comm. on Water Power., 65th Cong., 2nd Sess. 171 (Mar. 1918) [hereinafter 1918 
Hearing]. 
 27. Act of Feb. 15, 1901, ch. 371, 31 Stat. 790. In 1905, Congress transferred certain 
authorities to the Department of Agriculture. See Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628; see 
also Act of March 4, 1911, ch. 238, 36 Stat. 1253 (agricultural lands). Secretary of Interior 
Frank Lane and others considered this legislation ineffective and warranting repeal—but only 
if replacement legislation were secured. WATER-POWER DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF PUBLIC 
LANDS, H.R. REP. NO. 64-16, at 10 (1st Sess. Jan. 4, 1916) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 16]. 
 28. According to a 1916 House report, prior to the Act of February 15, 1901, there 
was no legislation on the subject at all; water-power sites went to patent unmolested, either 
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Reclamation Act along with other measures, and it continued 
enacting specific statutes authorizing particular electric 
generation projects.29 It also passed the 1906 General Dam Act, 
which required individual congressional assent for each project 
and established conditions for their development.30 This effectively 
gave Congress control over future hydroelectric project proposals. 
In an opinion by Attorney General Wickersham though, the 
Roosevelt Administration interpreted the Act as precluding the 
United States from charging waterpower developers a fee for the 
use of the nation’s water resources, prompting an amendment in 
1910.31 One example of this piecemeal and cumbersome statutory 
process was Congress’ 1906 authorization of the Secretary of War’s 
ability to allow water power diversions from the Niagara River.32 
Not surprisingly, Roosevelt, objecting to this practice, issued 
several vetoes including one that would have allowed the Muscle 
Shoals Power Company to continue to pursue its power project, 
where he  noted how the United States should instead be 
compensated.33 Gifford Pinchot later characterized this veto as the 
“first sign of change” in allowing private interests to utilize our 
                                                             
as parts of homesteads or by purchase, and were given no Federal attention whatever. Under 
this procedure, a large number of the power sites on the public domain were frittered away 
and have passed into private ownership beyond regulation, beyond control. H.R. REP. NO. 16, 
supra note 27, at 8. 
 29. JEROME G. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER – POWER LEGISLATION 81, 85–89, 10511, 
129–30 (1926); see also MICHAEL C. ROBINSON, WATER FOR THE WEST: THE BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION 1902-1977 918 (1979).  
 30. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3508, 34 Stat. 386; see also KERWIN, supra note 29, at 
11114. 
 31. See Charles K. McFarland, The Federal Government and Water Power, 1901-
1913: A Legislative Study in the Nascence of Regulation, 42 LAND ECON. 441, 449 (1966). For 
the history of these and other early efforts, see MILTON CONOVER, THE FEDERAL POWER 
COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1923); Frank R. McNinch, The 
Evolution of Federal Control of Electric Power, 12 J. OF LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 111 (1936). 
For a discussion of the Forest Service’s approach toward charging for the use of water 
resources within Forest Reserves, see GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 336–38 
(1947). 
 32. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3619, 34 Stat. 626. 
 33. 36 CONG. REC. 3071 (1903); see also 42 CONG. REC. 4698 (1908) (Rainy River veto); 
43 Cong. Rec. 97880 (1909) (James River veto). See generally CONOVER, supra note 31, at 
4851, 53 (discussing Rainy River veto and Taft’s veto of Coosa River project); see also 
McNinch, supra note 31, at 112–13 (discussing vetoes and their importance). 
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water resources.34 According to Milton Conover, “[t]hese vetoes 
constituted a rallying-point in the water-power situation,”35 and 
prompted Congress’ 1910 amendment to the 1906 General Dam 
Act.36 Simultaneously with these developments, the conservation 
movement began voicing concerns about the adverse consequences 
to our nation’s river systems. Indeed, the battle over Hetch Hetchy 
and San Francisco’s thirst for water and hydroelectric power, in 
particular, surfaced as a notable project precipitating widespread 
interest and controversy.37 
Notably, national conversations about the use of our water 
resources would become a focal point for progressives. Even Teddy 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism favored national control.38 
Progressives not only firmly believed in the capacity for experts to 
plan our society, but also believed that experts could do so with the 
facility of ensuring that we both use and conserve our natural 
resources for future generations. President Roosevelt lamented 
how “the failure to use our own [rivers] is astonishing, and no 
thoughtful man can believe that it will last,” adding how we ought 
to deploy our river systems to their “utmost” for irrigation, power, 
and water supply.39 Waterpower in particular, he added, could 
                                                             
 34. PINCHOT, supra note 31, at 327. 
 35. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 53. 
 36. Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 359, 36 Stat. 593. Between 1910 and 1916, Congress 
approved just thirteen projects. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 53. In 1912, Congress provided 
the Secretary of War with general authority to augment any otherwise authorized dam with 
improvements “as may be considered desirable for the future development of its water power.” 
Act of July 25, 1912, ch. 253, 37 Stat. 201, 233. A year earlier, Congress granted the Secretary 
of Agriculture with generic authority to regulate and approve rights of way across Forest 
System lands, including rights of way for “electrical poles and lines for the transmission and 
distribution of electrical power.” Act of March 4, 1911, ch. 238, 36 Stat. 1235, 1253. 
 37. See generally NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND 
WATER, 1770s-1990s 169–90 (1992); ROBERT W. RIGHTER, THE BATTLE OVER HETCH HETCHY: 
AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DAM AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM 117 
(2005). 
 38. See generally Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, The New 
Nationalism (Aug. 31, 1910), in AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM: A READER 211–23 (Ronald J. 
Pestritto & William J. Atto eds., 2008). 
 39. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS COMMISSION, S. DOC. NO. 60-
325, at iii–v (1st Sess. Feb. 26, 1908) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].  
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replace the nation’s (believed) “diminishing supplies of coal.”40 To 
tap our water resources correctly, though, would require expert 
planners, and he urged assembling “the best experts available” to 
help plan how to best develop the nation’s waterways.41 Roosevelt 
tasked the Inland Waterways Commission with developing a 
comprehensive water resource plan and deemed the Commission 
“a recognized authority on water power.”42 This emphasis on water 
resources expanded the “conservation” agenda beyond national 
forests43 and helped precipitate the symbolic birth of the 
“conservation” movement.44 By 1908, the progressive 
“conservation” community began examining how best to utilize the 
nation’s water resources without allowing private, monopolistic 
control.45 Wisconsin University President, Charles Hise, echoed the 
prevailing optimistic sentiment by suggesting how waterpower 
might furnish the nation’s entire power requirements—albeit 
limited only by the technical barriers inhibiting long-distance 
transmission lines.46  
Yet, several policies first needed resolution before any 
significant water resource development could occur. Should states 
or the federal government regulate the potential concentration of 
                                                             
 40. Id. at iv. 
 41. Id. at vi.  
 42. Theodore Roosevelt, The Inland Waters Commission, SCI. 996–97,  (June 26, 
1908). He also solicited Congress’ aid to establish an “administrative machinery for 
coordinating the work of the various Departments.” PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 
v. The Commission performed its work swiftly and without, as Gifford Pinchot describes it, 
congressional appropriations. PINCHOT, supra note 31, at 329. 
 43. See JUDSON KING, THE CONSERVATION FIGHT: FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO 
THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 13 (1959); PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at iii–iv.  
 44. The Commission’s effort prompted a White House commission on conservation 
and a resulting national conference. The National Conservation Commission, thereafter, 
published a comprehensive report that, unfortunately, Congress would ignore. See generally 
CHARLES RICHARD VAN HISE, THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 5–12 (1910); PINCHOT, supra note 31, at 326–60; W. J. MCGEE, THE CONSERVATION OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1909-1910 361, 374–75 (1910); Roosevelt, supra note 42. 
 45. New York’s Governor, for instance, warned against allowing private, perpetual, 
control of the nation’s resources. KING, supra note 43, at 19. 
 46. VAN HISE, supra note 46, at 119–22, 136. 
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ownership of water power resources? Should states or the federal 
government decide whether to own or regulate water power use?47 
Or, perhaps, should water resources be developed by private 
entities, or alternatively by governmental entities, such as 
municipalities, States, or the Federal Government? If the former, 
should private developers be regulated—or, instead, should they 
just be sold the resource at some appropriate price? And if private 
development would be allowed, would developers enjoy a perpetual 
“right” to the resource or could the United States or a state later 
recapture the resource for the public’s benefit?  
The fear of industry consolidation and monopolization of water 
resources naturally captured considerable interest—after all, the 
issue dominated many national dialogues (perhaps the most 
prominent fear of consolidation was with the oil industry).48 
Indeed, in 1910, 13 companies reportedly owned one-third of the 
nation’s waterpower resources.49 In his 1908 message 
accompanying the interim report of the Inland Waterways 
Commission, President Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the evils 
of the “consolidation of companies controlling water power.”50 A 
report by the Commissioner of Corporations addressed the issue of 
industry concentration, recommending governmental supervision 
                                                             
 47. Many states already had public utility commissions, urged into existence by the 
electric utility mogul Samuel Insul, as a protective measure for the electric utility industry. 
See ROBERT L. BRADLEY JR., EDISON TO ENRON: ENERGY MARKETS AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
172 (2011). 
 48. The concern remained after the FWPA’s passage. See infra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. See DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW 
TECHNOLOGY 288 (1990). In 1916, the House Committee on Public Lands noted that “more 
than 90 percent of the water power in the public-land States is owned by 28 private 
corporations and their subsidiaries, and that 6 of these control together over 56 per cent of the 
developed power.” H.R. REP. NO. 16, supra note 28, at 10. And 17 of those 28 companies had 
some form of relationship to General Electric Company. Id. at 11. 
 50. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at v. The Preliminary Inland Waterways 
Report emphasized the need for active federal and state regulation of the monopolization in 
the power sector. KING, supra note 43, at 14. “In 1908 and 1909 President Roosevelt, realizing 
the danger from monopoly which the private ownership of water-power sites might involve, 
ordered the withdrawal from entry of large areas along streams in the Rocky Mountain and 
Pacific States, on recommendation of the Reclamation Service.” BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, 
A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICES 508 (1965). 
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over development of water power facilities but not over the electric 
rates from that development.51 In 1915, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court feared the consequences of industry concentration 
when considering the ability to condemn property: 
Probably the most feared combination to be guarded 
against is the acquisition of the water powers of the country 
by one or more great aggregations of capital, which in view 
of the certainty of the exhaustion of our coal measures at no 
distant date will give such monopolies the full control of 
light, heating and power, and with them domination over 
the very means of existence of the public. With that view, 
the General Assembly of this State, in conferring the power 
of condemnation on telephone and electric light and power 
companies by ch. 74, Laws 1907, inserted a proviso: “Water 
powers, developed or undeveloped, with the necessary land 
adjacent thereto for their development, shall not be 
taken.”52 
That same year Senate Resolution No. 544 charged the 
Secretary of Agriculture with “furnish[ing] the Senate with all 
information in his possession as to the ownership and control of the 
water-power sites in the United States,” along with “any facts 
bearing upon the question as to the existence of a monopoly in the 
ownership and control of hydroelectric power in the United 
States.”53 The resulting report warned of an “increasing tendency 
toward concentration in the control of the development, 
distribution, and sale of electric power,” with the potential ability 
to influence other industries, such as banking, through 
                                                             
 51. See Frederick P. Royce, A Consideration of the Report of Commissioner of 
Corporations on Water Power Development of the United States, 10 STONE & WEBSTER 335 
(1912); see also KERWIN, supra note 29, at 156. The report remained an important part of the 
national dialogue for several years.  McFarland, supra note 31, at 450. 
 52. Blue Ridge Interurban Ry. Co. v. Hendersonville Light & Power Co., 86 S.E. 296, 
296–97 (N.C. 1915). The company sought to develop along the Narrows of the Green River. Id. 
at 296. The plaintiff (a South Carolina company) was incorporated as an interurban railway 
in its sister state in order to do business in North Carolina, and the defendant was supplying 
electric power to Hendersonville and its nearby community. Id. 
 53. See SEC’Y OF AGRIC., ELECTRIC POWER DEV. IN THE U.S, S. DOC. NO. 64-316, pt. I, 
at 3 (1st Sess. 1916). 
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interlocking directorates and other devices.54 This structure 
hampered any individual state’s ability to oversee utility projects 
within its borders.55 
Along with industry concentration, conversations often 
targeted the efficacy of allowing private control rather than 
federal, state, or municipal development.56 Progressives generally 
accepted that waterpower ought to be “controlled” rather than 
“owned” by “the public.”57 Several governors believed that, if states 
could not own the resource, they at least ought to be the ones 
“controlling” the resource.58 In Nebraska, for instance, the state 
[C]reated a water commission whose report predicted the 
future of water-power in the United States and the need of 
its control by governmental agencies, whether state or 
nation, or both working cooperatively, and emphasized the 
                                                             
 54. Id. at 14–15, 53.  
 55. See CONOVER, supra note 31, at 14. 
 56. Municipal ownership for water supply, for example, had become fairly robust. See 
generally EVANS CLARK, MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (1916). And for electric 
generation, as of 1902, roughly 22 percent of the electric generation facilities were municipally 
owned and operated, jumping to 27 percent five years later, and rising to 30 percent by 1912. 
Id. at 6. Yet these publicly owned facilities were small plants, producing only about 5 percent 
of the total generation capacity. Id. According to Clark, therefore, the “private promoter had 
captured the big prizes in the electric field.” Id. at 7. At the federal level, for instance, the 
United States in 1907 had constructed the Laguna Dam in Imperial Valley California, and a 
federal dam and canal system along the Snake River in Idaho, all opposed by the trade 
association for the emerging electric utility industry. See NYE, supra note 49, at 300. 
 57. E.g., HAVEMEYER, supra note 11, at 133–41. Progressive community activity in some cities 
promoted “community ownership and operation of public or community utilities.” BENJAMIN PARKE DE 
WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT; A NON-PARTISAN, COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 352 (1915). 
 58. See Governors Uphold Rights of States, NEW YORK TIMES 3 (Jan. 20, 1910), 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9E0CE0DB1539E433A25753C2A9679C946196D6CF (describing addresses by 
New York Governor Hughes, Colorado Governor Shafroth, and Wyoming Governor Brooks, at 
Conference of Governors). Once Congress passed the FWPA, some states continued their 
refrain about state control by claiming that the new act infringed states’ rights. New York to 
Defend State’s Rights in Water-Power Hearing, 77 ELECTRICAL WORLD 169 (Jan. 15, 1921); 
New York State Opens Fight on Water-Power Act, 77 ELECTRICAL WORLD 219 (Jan. 15, 1921);. 
see generally William H. Rose, Control Of Super-Power, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 171–73 (1931); 
see also KERWIN, supra note 29, at 290 (noting New York’s withdrawal of its lawsuit). 
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concentration of water-power in the hands of corporations 
and syndicates, the inadequacy of the then existing laws.59  
In 1915, the Western States Water Power Conference asserted 
that states ought to control the resources within their domain.60 
Conversely, in 1911, former President Roosevelt championed 
waterpower’s importance and corresponding need for federal 
supervision, rather than allowing state chartered monopolies.61 A 
1911 editorial in the magazine Conservation discussed 
waterpower’s importance and why the question about 
governmental control had entered a “critical stage.”62 When the 
nation elected Woodrow Wilson, “[w]aterpower development” had 
become “a matter of great concern to the whole country; it was 
before the public as it never had been.”63 And the concept of placing 
responsibility in a federal commission for supervising the 
development of waterpower was gaining currency.64 
But so too, forces advocating for public ownership of water 
resources carried significant resonance. Water resources, after all, 
had become a “public resource”—considered by courts as matters 
for state superintendence.65 Forces favoring public ownership 
                                                             
 59. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 14. 
 60. Id. at 15. 
 61. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 42. 
 62. Editorial, 1 AM. CONSERV. 193, 195 (July 1911). 
 63. KERWIN, supra note 29, at 171. See also COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, 
WATER-POWER DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES XV (1912) (“Within the last decade, 
through the development of electric transmission of power, our water-power resources have 
come into national importance.”). Samuel Hayes chronicles how conservation captivated the 
progressive movement in what has since become seminal history of the conservation 
philosophy during the progressive era. SAMUEL P. HAYES, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF 
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); see also Gifford 
Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 9 (1945). 
 64. KERWIN, supra note 29, at 204. In 1913, the National Conservation Congress, at 
Gifford Pinchot’s urging, passed a resolution favoring federal supervision. MORTON KELLER, 
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 
1900-1933 162 (1990). In the few years prior to 1920, the necessity of coordinating with some 
counterpart federal commission heightened for newly formed state commissions, as well. 
CONOVER, supra note 31, at 15. Maine, for instance, created its commission in 1918. Id. at 16. 
 65. KELLER, supra note 64, at 162. The parallel with public land management is 
considerable; progressives similarly treated nonmetallic minerals and waterpower sites as 
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paralleled the conversation surrounding President Wilson’s 
program for federally developing waterpower (and other 
potentials) at the Tennessee Muscle Shoals site.66 The question of 
who should benefit from hydroelectric energy generation, after all, 
surfaced in the fight surrounding Hetch Hetchy.67 With 
waterpower development impeded,68 a several-year national 
conversation then followed about whether water resources should 
be privately tapped or owned and controlled by the Federal 
government.69 Indeed, as one writer puts it, the “public-versus-
private-power conflicts dominated the world of electricity for a half 
a century.”70 Utilities naturally favored federal regulatory 
legislation, undoubtedly to avoid the problems with an ad hoc 
process for securing specific individual authorization from 
                                                             
equally warranting protection against federal giveaways. See J. Leonard Bates, Fulfilling 
American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 to 1921, 44 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 
29, 48, 53 (1957).  
 66. See generally NORTH CALLAHAN, TVA: BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS (1980); 
PRESTON J. HUBBARD, ORIGINS OF TVA: THE MUSCLE SHOALS CONTROVERSY 1920-1932 
(1961); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A STUDY IN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 3–30 (1943); RICHARD LOWITT, GEORGE W. NORRIS: THE PERSISTENCE OF A 
PROGRESSIVE (1971); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, TVA AND THE POWER FIGHT 1933-1939 (1971). 
 67. See generally ROBERT W. RIGHTER, THE BATTLE OVER HETCH HETCHY: AMERICA’S 
MOST CONTROVERSIAL DAM AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM 167–90 (2005); 
see also NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770S-1990S 
187–90 (1992). 
 68. See McFarland, supra note 31, at 451. 
 69. For a historical summary, see generally HAYES, supra note 63; KERWIN, supra 
note 29; McFarland, supra note 31. Senator La Follette’s third party presidential campaign 
advocated federal ownership of water resources, rather than monopoly-controlled private 
ownership. JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: VOLUMES IV 
& V 1918-1933 104–05 (1959). Herbert Hoover, in 1924, responded how he had “no taste for 
Federal operation and distribution of power. We shall be able to protect the public interest 
through the terms of lease or through the regulatory powers of our state commissions.” NAT’L 
ELECTRIC LIGHT ASS’N, POLITICAL OWNERSHIP AND THE ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER 
INDUSTRY 43–44 (1925). Chief Justice William H. Taft similarly believed that advocating for 
public ownership was “short-sighted.” Id. at 58. 
 70. RIGHTER, supra note 37, at 167. In 1920, the United States Geological Survey 
even floated the possibility of a nationally-owned and operated electric grid, an idea 
unsurprisingly rejected by private developers. BRADLEY, supra note 47, at 175. 
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Congress or being subjected to varying state programs.71 With that 
said, over 400 projects were authorized through some other means 
prior to the passage of the FPA.72 Of course, not surprisingly, the 
significant number of hydroelectric power applications with the 
Commission (once Congress passed a federal waterpower act) 
demonstrated industry’s favorable attitude toward the federal 
legislation.73 As of 1920, however, waterpower development lagged 
when compared with coal.74 
                                                             
 71. E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND 
RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-50, at 120 (Stuart Bruchey & Eleanor Bruchey eds., 1951) (“The 
water-power question represented the most clear-cut example of the efforts by a major private 
interest to produce a law favorable to itself.”). 
 72. 1927 FPC SEVENTH ANN. REP. 18.  
 73. According to E. Louise Peffer, 
The water-power question presented the most clear-cut example of the efforts 
by a major private interest to produce a law favorable to itself. The 
hydroelectric industry did not attempt to prevent the adoption of regulatory 
legislation, . . . It wanted a law, but one strictly phrased to guard its interests. 
PEFFER, supra note 71, at 120. Utilities began submitting preliminary permits once Congress 
acted and, by the close of 1920, the FPC received 137 applications. Water-Power Applications 
Filed in 1920, 13,000,000 Hp., 77 ELECTRICAL WORLD 138 (1921). Electric generation from 
waterpower (federal and state) rose from 8.9 million horse-power in 1921, to over 12 million 
by 1928. HAVEMEYER, supra note 11, at 177. In fact, by 1928, hydroelectric power reportedly 
accounted for roughly 40% of the energy generated by the private electric utilities. Id. at 183. 
A drought in 1929 then reduced hydroelectric generation, potentially signaling the need for 
other, more stable resources. Id. at 184. 
 74. CHESTER G. GILBERT, JOSEPH E. POGUE, AMERICA’S POWER RESOURCES: THE 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF COAL, OIL AND WATER-POWER 166 (1921).  The lack of federal 
legislation may have impeded waterpower’s growth, although other factors were at play as 
well, such as transmission constraints. Id. at 166–70, 178–79, 183, 236. Testifying in 1918 
about comparing coal with hydroelectric energy, a Westinghouse Electric official noted that 
“[i]t has been frequently pointed out that, as the nation’s coal supply is depleted, the cost of 
coal must rise, thus increasing the cost of steam-electric power as a competitor and raising the 
market value of hydroelectric power accordingly.” 1918 HEARING, supra note 26, at 172, 702 
(Statement of Electrical World editor that coal suffering from shortages due to labor, materials, 
and transportation). But he added how hydroelectric energy was potentially less desirable 
than steam energy because of seasonal variation in water flow affecting generation potential. 
Id. at 173. This led him to conclude that hydroelectric energy could not effectively compete 
with steam generation. Id. at 175. Indeed, a Pacific Gas & Electric official testified that 
transmitting hydroelectric energy over 200 miles cost roughly four to five times as much as an 
equivalent coal-fired steam plant (if coal is available). Id. at 216, 220–221 (discussing oil-fired 
steam plant). 
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Although Congress began meaningfully debating water power 
legislation in 1916,75 it took another four years before it could 
resolve the principal policy issues and adopt the 1920 Federal 
Water Power Act (FWPA).76 The Secretary of Agriculture was 
championing federal legislation, particularly because Forest 
System lands contained “approximately one-half of the water-
power of the West.”77 And in 1917, Agriculture Secretary Houston 
urged adopting a commission model: 
Legislation which will make it possible to safeguard the 
public interests, and at the same time to protect private 
investors, should result in securing cheaper water-power 
and in conserving the coal and fuel-oil supply. Since three 
departments of the government are vitally concerned in 
water-power legislation and its possible terms and would be 
vitally affected by the administrative handling of matters 
under such legislation, it would seem desirable to consider 
whether it is feasible to devise an executive body on which 
the three departments will be represented and which will 
                                                             
 75. In meetings of the National Conservation Congress in 1913 and 1916, the issue 
of waterpower development surfaced; the 1913 congress tasked a Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology professor with chairing a committee and developing a report on elements for 
legislation. See Henry Sturgis Drinker, The Position of Engineers Toward the Question of 
Water Power Development in the West, in REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN 
MINING CONGRESS 374 (1917). Also early in 1913 and 1914, the Wilson Administration worked 
with Congress to draft the contours of a federal water power bill, which when introduced 
received a chilly reception. See KERWIN, supra note 29, at 172–83 (discussing the “Adamson” 
and “Ferris” bills). By 1916, the water-power issue had become pronounced at the national 
level. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 57. The 1916 House Committee on Public Lands, considering 
H.R. 408, commented how an earlier version of the bill triggered “[e]xtensive hearings” for the 
prior Congress and how “[t]he committee sought and received testimony from the best water-
power students and thinkers on this subject in the United States.” H.R. REP. NO. 16, supra 
note 28, at 1. For the companion Senate report, see DEVELOPMENT OF WATER POWER, S. REP. 
NO. 64-66 (1st Sess. Jan. 25, 1916). 
 76. The Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). The following year, 
Congress prohibited licensing any project or project works “within the limits of as now 
constituted of any national park or national monument,” unless expressly allowed by 
Congress. Act of March 3, 1921, 41 Stat. 1353 (1921). For a discussion of the FPA’s use of the 
term “reservations,” see generally Memorandum from John D. Leshy, the Solicitor, to Sec’y Dir. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Jan. 9, 2001). 
 77. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 45. 
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be able to utilize to the best advantage all their existing 
agencies.78 
By this time, federal commissions, in the mold of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, had become accepted.79 
Congress, after all, had passed the Pure Food and Drug Act in 
1906,80 as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.81 
After a few years of active consideration, Congress eventually 
acted in 1920.82 The 1936 Chairman of the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC or Commission) would later herald how “[t]he 
15-year battle of the conservationists to safeguard the Nation’s 
water power came to a successful climax in 1920 when, under the 
courageous leadership of Woodrow Wilson, the Federal Water 
Power Act became law.”83 The FPC would be slightly different than 
prior commissions, this one consisting of high-ranking officials—
the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War, and the 
Secretary of Agriculture. 
Congress vested these cabinet-level officials with the power to 
regulate hydroelectric projects along interstate navigable waters, 
water bodies across national boundaries, as well as federal public 
lands and reservations.84 This power included authority over 
intrastate rates affecting interstate rates, although it 
                                                             
 78. Id. at 46, 69 (quoting 1917 DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANN. REP. at 37).  
 79. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
 80. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
 81. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). 
 82. Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1920). The President accepted 
this approach, and by early 1918 the administration proposed that Congress establish a 
Federal Power Commission. CONOVER, supra note 31, at 60. The administration also suggested 
that Congress establish a special legislative committee capable of considering the range of 
water-power issues. Id. at 60–66 (summarizing events from 1918 to 1920). 
 83. McNinch, supra note 31, at 114. 
 84. Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1920); see 1918 HEARING, supra 
note 2626, at 676–77 (Secretary of Interior Lane discussing justification for cabinet level 
commissioners). According to the Commission, its authority was “no broader than the 
authority previously exercised or exercisable by Congress. In every instance, except where 
public lands are involved, the commission’s jurisdiction is expressly limited to those streams 
or parts thereof ‘over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate 
commerce.’” See FPC SEVENTH ANN. REP., supra note 72, at 7–8. The Commission’s 
jurisdictional language was later enlarged in 1935. See infra note 114. 
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contemplated a new form of federalism by allowing state public 
utility commissions the authority to regulate rates for sales in 
either intra or interstate as well.85 Section 19 of the FWPA 
conditioned the issuance of a license upon the licensee’s abiding by 
“reasonable regulation” of “any duly constituted agency of the 
State in which the service is rendered or the rate is charged.”86 
Section 20 further provided “[t]hat when said power or any part 
thereof shall enter into interstate . . . commerce the rates charged 
and the service rendered  . . . shall be reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory, and just to the customer.”87 Section 20 also 
intimated acquiescence to federal authority by adding the Federal 
Power Commission would have jurisdiction if no state agency 
exists for any state “directly concerned” to enforce the Act’s 
proscriptions.88 According to the 1916 House Public Lands 
Committee,  
Where the business of a hydroelectric concern is wholly 
intrastate and the State has a utility board, rate fixing and 
regulation is left entirely with the State and is not molested 
by the Federal Government in any way. On the other hand, 
if the business is interstate, or even intrastate business, 
when the State has provided no utility board, then and in 
that event regulation is fixed by the Secretary of the 
Interior until such time as Congress may confer it upon the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, a water-power 
commission, or such other body as Congress may elect to 
confer it upon.89 
                                                             
 85. The Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, §§ 19, 20, 41 Stat. 1063, 1073–74 (1920). 
 86. Id. at 1073.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 1073–74. 
 89. H.R. REP. NO. 16, supra note 28, at 13. Soon after Congress passed the FWPA, 
the FPC alluded to its ability, if necessary, to regulate rates for interstate sales, but saw “at 
the present time little probability that occasion for such action will arise.” 1921 FPC FIRST 
ANN. REP. 62–63 (Gov't Printing Off.). The FPC infrequently invoked its ability to regulate 
intrastate rates in the absence of a state utility commission; in fact, it only regulated interstate 
rates twice by 1940. See BAUM, infra note 108, at 177–79, 180. In 1929, the Commission 
concluded that states could only regulate interstate waterpower rates if Congress specifically 
approved an interstate compact—that is, the FWPA section 20 did not itself serve “as 
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These provisions, therefore, reflected how states and the 
federal government could share responsibility in regulating even 
interstate transactions. In the same year that Congress adopted 
the FWPA, it passed the Motor Carriers Act, incorporating the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Shreveport Rate case allowing, if 
necessary, federal regulation over intrastate rates affecting 
interstate rates.90 Certain similarities existed between interstate 
carriers and waterpower projects. 
 It was well known that some of these waterpower projects 
were engaged in interstate commerce: a primary proponent of the 
legislation, and later the first executive officer for the new Federal 
Power Commission, O.C. Merrill, noted in 1918 that waterpower 
companies already operated in multiple states simultaneously.91 
He posited that it would not necessarily create a problem to allow 
states the ability to regulate rates for electricity moving across 
state boundaries because the states could regulate the sales within 
their own borders, and if someone objected, then, quite possibly, it 
could be regulated by the new federal commission.92 Indeed, Merrill 
testified that, 
[W]here a transmission line runs across a State line, and 
the same company serves customers in two or more States, 
that so long as the power of regulation of rates and of service 
is and can be exercised by the local authorities it had better 
be left with the local authorities. If any cases should arise 
where there is a disagreement between the authorities of 
two or more States over questions of rate or service 
regulations, and it could not be settled between those 
                                                             
Congressional authorization of interstate agreements.” Id. at 181. The Third Circuit rejected 
this interpretation in 1941. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. F.P.C., 124 F.2d 800, 808 (3d 
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 663 (1942). 
 90. Esch-Cummins Act, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920); see generally Paul S. 
Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 235 (2003); see also GERALD BERK, 
ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917 (John 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1997). 
 91. When asked whether the legislation would allow waterpower companies to “do 
business in two or more states,” Mr. Merrill responded that “[t]hey are doing it now.” 1918 
HEARING, supra note 26, at 99. 
 92. 1918 HEARING, supra note 26, at 67–68. 
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authorities, then it is intended that the matter may come 
before the commission for settlement.93 
When asked whether the drafters of the legislation considered 
simply giving the Commission authority to regulate “interstate 
business,” Merrill responded that they had, but believed “that 
matters of rates and services which are local in their character 
should be handled by the local authorities, if possible.”94 He 
explained to the congressional members how several projects in the 
Pacific Northwest and California crossed state boundaries and, “if 
the only criterion of jurisdiction is whether the lines cross State 
boundaries,” then all such projects would be under “exclusive 
control of the commission.”95 
Notably, through these provisions, the Act established one of 
the early regimes for what today we call cooperative federalism. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court would later observe how,  
Congress was concerned with overcoming the danger of 
divided authority so as to bring about the needed 
development of water power and also with the recognition 
of the constitutional rights of the states so as to sustain the 
validity of the Act. The resulting integration of the 
respective jurisdictions of the state and Federal 
Governments, is illustrated by the careful preservation of 
the separate interests of the states throughout the Act, 
                                                             
 93. Id. at 99. 
 94. Id. at 100. 
 95. Id. Merrill further indicated that he was aware of a circumstance in Nevada 
where the state commission had regulated rates for power shipped from California, although 
he was unsure if the matter had ever been litigated about whether that regulation offended 
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 101. When pressed again, he replied how it was his “judgment 
that so long as it is satisfactorily handled by the several States it had better be left with them.” 
Id. at 101102. This approach also supported Merrill’s belief that a cabinet level commission 
would become involved in rare cases, obviating the need for a traditional commission. 1918 
HEARING, supra note 26, at 101. A later witness also discussed how sales of energy from out of 
state could be regulated by the local state commission (such as Nevada) overseeing the sales 
to its local residents. Id. at 414, 416–17 (Statement of Mr. Hall). Testifying later in the 
hearings, however, Agriculture Secretary Houston chose his words carefully by alluding only 
to state commission’s authority of intrastate business. Id. at 660. 
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without setting up a divided authority over any one 
subject.96 
The Act, therefore, purportedly furnished a framework for 
cooperative federal and state efforts rather than usurping all state 
authority.97 Of course, this did not obviate subsequent efforts by 
states to question whether Congress had impermissibly intruded 
into their constitutional domain.98 
Next, by creating the Federal Power Commission, the Act 
resolved the duel between those who favored private capital 
investment (the winners) and those who believed that 
hydroelectric generation ought to be federally owned and managed 
(the losers).99 Responding to President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 
                                                             
 96. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 174 (1946). 
 97. FPC SEVENTH ANN. REP., supra note 72 at 2 (“[t]he commission has likewise from 
time to time emphasized the desirability of State and Federal cooperation in [waterpower] 
development.”). An early example occurred with the Conowingo hydroelectric project, along 
the Susquehanna River. The project would sell power across state lines and its transactions 
involved multiple jurisdictions. It sought the approval from utility commissions in Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, and from the Commission. The three commissions held joint hearings to 
examine the project, with the FPC concluding that the proceeding “furnished an excellent test 
of the regulatory features of the act and has demonstrated that with such cordial cooperation 
as existed in this case there need be no conflict in matters of regulatory jurisdiction between 
the Federal commission and the commissions of the several States.” 1926 FPC SIXTH ANN. 
REP. 6–9 (Gov’t Printing Off.). Prior to the FWPA, the states and the federal government had 
cooperated in surveying “water resources.” CONOVER, supra note 31, at 47. 
 98. See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926) (dismissed state claim for what 
today would be lack of standing); see also United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463 (1935) 
(similar result with suit by United States). Other challenges to the Act also were dismissed on 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. E.g. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 67 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 
1933), cert. denied 291 U.S. 674 (1934). In Ala. Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F. 606 (M.D. 
Ala. 1922), the District Court addressed a constitutional challenge to the Act and concluded: 
[T]his act authorizing the construction of dams in navigable streams to 
impound the water, where rocky or shoaly conditions obtain, for the purpose 
of improving navigation by the slack water method does not offend the 
Constitution. It was within the power of Congress to create a board called the 
Water Power Commission to carry out the purpose of Congress . . . . 
Id. at 620. 
 99. ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND HIS 
ADMINISTRATION 412 (1969); see also NYE, supra note 49, at 183. “[E]nough public power 
companies remained” in the 1920s “to raise troubling questions about fair rates, democratic 
control, and public service that would be widely debated again in the 1930s.” NYE, supra note 
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plea that Congress must provide the United States, or individual 
states, with the ability to recapture the resource if necessary,100 
Congress included several important provisions. First, it protected 
against a perpetual monopolization of resources by private entities 
by imposing a fifty-year maximum on Commission issued licenses 
to hydroelectric projects along the nation’s navigable waters.101 
Second, it provided a preference to states and municipal entities if 
they too sought to develop the resource and compete against a 
private entity for the right to develop a project.102 Third, upon the 
expiration of any license, the United States could “take over and 
thereafter [] maintain and operate any project” and associated 
property, “upon the condition that before taking possession it shall 
pay the [licensee’s] net investment.”103 And fourth, the Act required 
                                                             
49, at 183. See generally KERWIN, supra note 29, at 39–42 (discussing factors purportedly 
arresting development). 
100. H.R. REP. No. 99-507, at 11–12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 
2498–99 (quoting President Roosevelt). 
101. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 6, 41 Stat. 1063, 1067 (1920). At least as 
early as 1916, “[a] 50-year term is the one advocated by all of the authorities on the subject, 
both in the hearings, in the annual reports for the departments, in writings, and in reports 
upon the bill from the departments and other authorities on the subject.” H.R. REP. No. 99-
507, at 9. Congress, however, allowed licensees—with joint Commission and appropriate state 
utility commission approval—to execute power sales contracts that might extend beyond the 
license termination date. § 22, 41 Stat. at 1074. 
102. § 7, 41 Stat. at 1067. The idea of affording a preference had become well-
established for federal programs, and would continue after the passage of the FWPA. See 
generally GAO, FEDERAL POWER: THE EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCE IN MARKETING FEDERAL 
POWER (Feb. 2001). 
103. § 14, 41 Stat. at 1071. This section further preserved “the right of the United 
States or any State or municipality to take over, maintain, and operate any project” upon 
condemnation and the payment of just compensation. Id. at 1072. On the heels of World War 
I, and aware of the Muscle Shoals controversy, Congress also reserved the authority of the 
United States to enter and operate a project “for the purpose of manufacturing nitrates, 
explosives or munitions of war, or for any other purpose involving the safety of the United 
States,” provided that it compensated the licensee. § 16, 41 Stat. at 1072. Moreover, if the 
Commission so determined, it could require that the licensee furnish free of charge power to 
the United States for the operation of navigation facilities. § 11(c), 41 Stat. at 1070. And, if the 
Commission concluded that a particular future dam might be beneficially used by the United 
States, “no license therefor shall be issued until two years after it shall have reported to 
Congress the facts and conditions relating thereto.” § 4(d), 41 Stat. at 1066. In 1916, the 
recapture component of the legislation was considered “one of the most important provisions 
of the bill,” because it allowed the government to protect against a perpetual private grant. 
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that licensees pay the United States for the use of federal lands “or 
other property,” as well as for the costs of administering the Act.104 
Finally, the Act reflected the progressive and New Deal 
embrace of scientific management or planning.105 After all, 
scientific management accepted that we can manage our resources 
to maximize productivity and utilization. This was the mantra of 
Gifford Pinchot for both forest and water resources: it permeated 
discussions about the role of government in regulating private 
industry, it infused the business world and the followers of 
Frederick W. Taylor, and it, not surprisingly, justified the growth 
of modern zoning regulation.106 Congress provided, therefore, in 
section 10 of the Federal Water Power Act, that the Commission 
could issue a license upon the condition that “[t]he project adopted 
. . . shall be such as in the judgment of the commission will be best 
adapted to a comprehensive scheme of improvement and 
utilization for the purposes of navigation, of water-power 
development, and of other beneficial uses. . .”107 
The Commission’s early years were anything but stellar. In his 
review of the history, Donald Swain describes the agency as 
“ineffective,” marred by a lack of money, staff, and, even, interest 
among the Commissioners.108 Between, for instance, 1920 and 
                                                             
H.R. REP. No. 99-507, at 12.  Later, in 1936, FPC Chairman McNinch described the recapture 
provision as “[o]ne of the most important provisions of the Act of 1920.” McNinch, supra note 
31, at 115. 
104. § 10(e), 41 Stat. at 1069. Reflecting its approach toward state regulation, 
Congress, inter alia, also included language to prevent a licensee from making excessive profits 
before an appropriate state commission could protect consumers. Id. 
 105. See generally 41 Stat. 1063. 
106. See generally SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1890-1920 (1964); HAYES, supra note 63; THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDIES, ALFRED 
E. KAHN (1984). 
107. § 10(a), 41 Stat. at 1068. 
108. DONALD C. SWAIN, FEDERAL CONSERVATION POLICY 1921-1933 113 (1963). At 
first, the Commission could not even hire a complete staff and was forced to use employees 
from each Commissioner’s own agency. Id. at 113–14. By 1927, the Commission warned that 
it could not enforce the Act until Congress afforded it money and personnel.  FPC SEVENTH 
ANN. REP., supra note 72 at 2; see also ROBERT D. BAUM, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 
AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION 23–26 (1942) (describing the commission’s early limitations). 
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1929, “the FPC convened only ninety-nine times, with the usual 
meeting lasting less than thirty minutes.”109 In lieu of acting like a 
modern regulatory agency—the objective of Executive Secretary 
O.C. Merrill—the Commission instead heeded the wishes of the 
emerging electric utility industry:  
[T]he most significant factor in determining the weakness 
of the FPC was the great influence private power came to 
exert within the commission. After he had resigned, a 
former executive secretary of the Federal Power 
Commission described how the Niagara Falls Power 
Company in 1928 brought pressure to bear on the members 
of the commission to win changes in an important report 
recommending amendments to the Water Power Act of 
1920. By 1929 the National Electric Light Association could 
bring about the extent of its influence in the FPC. * * * 
Regulation of water power development during most of the 
1920’s was in name only.110 
In late 1929, President Hoover addressed one problem with 
the Commission by calling for the establishment of a “full-time 
commission.”111 Congress responded in 1930, establishing the 
Commission as an independent agency with commissioners, in lieu 
of being run by an otherwise distracted cabinet-level body.112 
                                                             
Congress finally appropriated funds once the agency refused to issue any new licenses. 
DONALD C. SWAIN, FEDERAL CONSERVATION POLICY 1921-1933 115 (1963). 
109. SWAIN, supra note 108, at 115. 
110. Id. at 114. “The ineffectiveness of the commission became so apparent that 
Congress instituted a full investigation in early 1930.” Id. at 115. 
111. See BAUM, supra note 108, at 27. 
112. SWAIN, supra note 108, at 115; see also Pub. L. No. 71-412, 46 Stat. 797 (1930) 
(An Act to Reorganize the Federal Power Commission). Congress empowered the President to 
appoint 5 commissioners, with the advice and consent of the Senate, with one commissioner 
serving as the “chairman” and “principal executive officer.” 46 Stat. 797. Congress also directed 
that, “after the expiration of the original term of the commissioner so designated as chairman 
by the President, chairmen shall be elected by the commission itself, each chairman when so 
elected to act as such until the expiration of his term of office.” Id. The Act further provided a 
salary, term, rotation, bar against appointing potentially biased commissioners, and schedule 
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Unfortunately, the new legislation did not immediately cure the 
agency’s problems.113 
It would be another five years before Congress would address 
two enveloping issues. To begin with, Congress needed to resolve 
the jurisdictional gap created by the Supreme Court, when the 
Court held that states could not regulate wholesale sales of 
electricity across state lines.114 After Rhode Island’s Public Utility 
Commission increased the rate a Rhode Island utility could charge 
a Massachusetts utility for energy, the Massachusetts’ utility—
Attleboro Steam and Electric Company—challenged its 
neighboring state commission’s authority to establish rates for the 
sale of energy across state lines.115 In 1927, the Supreme Court 
announced its opinion in Public Utilities Comm’n of Rhode Island 
v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co and concluded that Rhode Island’s 
effort to regulate the rate for the sale of wholesale electric energy 
into another state violated the dormant Commerce Clause.116 
Attleboro’s significance would grow as the nation’s interstate 
                                                             
period for the commissioners, as well as establishing an office in Washington, D.C. and 
affording the Commission the authority to appoint and pay for a staff. Id. 
113. SWAIN, supra note 108, at 115. In January 1931, moreover, President Hoover 
complained about the Senate’s treatment of his appointees to the new commission. Herbert 
Hoover: Statement About Refusal to Resubmit Federal Power Commission Appointments to the 
Senate, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22599 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
114. Federal Power Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). Congress, 
anticipating a broader appreciation for Commerce Clause jurisprudence, also enlarged the 
Commission’s jurisdiction (for post 1935 construction or modification) to include licensing 
facilities on waterbodies that affect interstate or foreign commerce or on “commerce clause” 
streams. See F.P.C. v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965). For subsequent amendments, see 
Pub. L. No. 80-558, 62 Stat. 275 (1948); Pub. L. No. 81-429, 63 Stat. 954 (1949); 64 Stat. 1265 
(1949); Pub. L. No. 247, 65 Stat. 701 (1951); Pub. L. No. 83-211, 67 Stat. 461 (1953); Pub. L. 
No. 83-279, 67 Stat. 587 (1953); Pub. L. No. 84-550, 70 Stat. 226 (1956); Pub. L. No 85-791, 72 
Stat. 941, 947 (1958); Pub. L. No. 87-647, Pub. L. No. 87-648, 76 Stat. 447 (1962); Pub. L. No. 
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978); Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-375, 96 
Stat. 1819 (1982); Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986); Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 
3097 (1992); Pub. L. No. 103-347, 108 Stat. 4585 (1994); Pub. L. No. 104-66, 109 Stat. 718 
(1995); Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-38, 127 Stat. 493 (2013) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.). 
115. For a history of the decision, see Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy 
Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. (forthcoming 2017). 
116. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
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transmission grid developed. In 1928, a little over 10% of the 
nation’s electric generation moved in interstate commerce, but in 
just 5 years that number would grow to 18%.117 For instance, in 
1933, Illinois reportedly exported roughly 16% of its electric 
generation while importing about 17.5%.118 
Secondly, much of the dialogue during this period focused on 
the alleged evils accompanying industry consolidation and 
monopolization. In 1925, for instance, the Federal Trade 
Commission examined the problem with industry concentration, 
precipitating a more robust inquiry a few years later.119 The FTC’s 
investigations, along with additional congressional inquiries, 
produced at least ninety volumes of materials, addressing the 
problem with electric utility holding companies—the Power 
Trust.120 Moving against the Power Trusts was an item on 
President Roosevelt’s agenda.121 He was joined by his FPC 
Commissioners’ Frank McNinch (from North Carolina) and Claude 
Draper (from Wyoming), who helped champion the cause.122 But 
according to Ellis Hawley, “[t]he first shot in the Administration’s 
campaign came in July 1934 when the President appointed Harold 
Ickes chairman of a National Power Policy Committee,” charged 
with considering legislation that would address the Attleboro gap 
as well as industry consolidation and control.123 This was followed 
by an interdepartmental committee, which produced a draft 
legislative proposal floated in February 1935 by Senator Burton K. 
                                                             
117. McNinch, supra note 31, at 116. 
118. Id. For an analysis of the interstate grid in 1930, see William C. Scott, State and 
Federal Control of Power Transmission as Affected by the Interstate Commerce Clause, 14 
PROC. OF THE ACADEMY OF POL. SCI. 135 (1930). 
119. BRADLEY, supra note 47, at 176. 
120. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF 
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 327 n.2 (1966). 
121. Id. at 328–29. 
122. Id. at 327. 
123. Id. at 330–31. In March 1935, Roosevelt forwarded the Committee’s report to 
Congress. Id. at 333; see also BAUM, supra note 108, at 29–30, 126. The Committee, however, 
lacked sufficient authority to implement its views about power planning. PHILLIP J. 
FUNIGIELLO, TOWARD A NATIONAL POWER POLICY: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ELECTRIC UTILITY 
INDUSTRY, 1931-1941 39–43 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1973). 
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Wheeler, and congressman Sam Rayburn.124 And before the year’s 
end, Congress responded by passing the Federal Power Act and 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, filling the Attleboro 
gap and addressing holding companies and industry 
concentration.125 
III. HYDROELECTRIC POWER CONFRONTS THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
After WWII, hydroelectric power became a symbol for how 
federal programs could energize our economy, and policy-makers 
correspondingly perceived hydroelectric resources as immune from 
both the challenges confronting the supply/demand balance for 
coal and the resource constraints of oil and gas.126 After all, 
Congress had established the Tennessee Valley Authority in 
1933,127 the Hoover Dam was built in 1936, and the Bonneville 
Power Administration was established in 1937.128 By 1940, 
hydroelectric generation supplied roughly 40% of the nation’s 
electricity, having more than tripled its total national capacity in 
just two decades.129 In 1948, for instance, then Secretary Krug 
informed President Truman that “We should be doing much more 
in determining our energy reserves, in producing and using our 
fuels less wastefully, and in developing power from inexhaustible 
hydroelectric sources instead of exhaustible coal, oil and gas.”130 
                                                             
 124. HAWLEY, supra note 120, at 332. 
125. See generally James W. Moeller, Requiem for the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935: The “Old” Federalism and State Regulation of Inter-State Holding Companies, 17 
ENERGY L. J. 343, 357–58 (1996). 
126. CRAUFURD D. GOODWIN, ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: TODAY’S PROBLEMS, 
YESTERDAY’S SOLUTIONS 7 (1981).  
127. Early on, TVA adopted a policy of selling power at the lowest possible rate, 
regardless of the effect on private utilities. JOSEPH C. SWIDLER, POWER AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE MEMOIRS OF JOSEPH C. SWIDLER 47 (2002). 
 128. History of Hydropower, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/eere/water/history-
hydropower (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
129. Id. TVA began expanding to steam-fired coal plants once hydroelectric generation 
had seemed to hit “peak capacity by the late 1940s.” SWIDLER, supra note 127, at 69. 
130. GOODWIN, supra note 126, at 37.  
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This, of course, would all change by the 1960s, with the advent 
of an emerging environmental consensus, typified by the now-
famous story surrounding Consolidated Edison’s (Con-Ed) ill-fated 
attempt to develop a pumped storage project at Storm King 
Mountain (formerly Butter Hill).131 That the FPC, at the time 
tagged with being a poorly managed agency,132 would become a 
focal point for environmental protection seems today quite 
natural—after all, the proposed damming the Colorado River along 
the Grand Canyon in the 1960s, as well as the fight to protect 
Dinosaur National Park, illustrated how dams had become an 
environmental target.133 By the early 1960s, Con-Ed sought 
additional generating capacity, necessary as the 1960s would 
strikingly demonstrate, to bolster not only an otherwise unreliable 
electric grid but also one lacking sufficient generating capacity.134 
The company’s fossil fuel fired generation plants in New York had 
produced the Nation’s worst SO2 problems, and it would be years 
before the company could secure additional nuclear energy from 
soon-to-be proposed additional generating capacity at Indian 
Point.135 As the largest proposed pumped storage project in the 
world, the Cornwall Project (the Project) would avoid increasing 
                                                             
131. See generally ROBERT H. BOYLE, THE HUDSON RIVER: A NATURAL AND 
UNNATURAL HISTORY (1969); ROBERT D. LIFSET, POWER ON THE HUDSON: STORM KING 
MOUNTAIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2014); ALLAN 
R. TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE AND THE BIRTH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1972). 
132. See SWIDLER, supra note 127, at 122. 
133. See generally JON M. COSCO, ECHO PARK: STRUGGLE FOR PRESERVATION 
(Johnson Books 1995); RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STAND LIKE A DAM: GLEN CANYON 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF THE WEST (Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 1st ed. 1990). 
Historian Patricia Limerick wrote that, with the Echo Park controversy, “the well-established 
expectation that large dams would continue to be built went sailing off a cliff and landed in a 
heap.” PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK & JASON L. HANSON, A DITCH IN TIME: THE CITY, THE 
WEST, AND WATER 166 (2012). 
 134. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 87. 
135. The company operated the largest oil-fired generation facility in the country, 
known as the Big Allis (1,000 MW), at Ravenswood. TALBOT, supra note 131, at 70–71. And, 
in 1962, Con-Ed began operating the first nuclear plant (275 MW) at Indian Point, over twenty 
miles north of the City. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 87. 
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SO2 emissions by providing peaking power potentially capable of 
averting blackouts or planned brownouts.136 
But the Project (including the accompanying transmission 
line) threatened the scenic beauty for the surrounding 
communities; if completed, it would destroy the historic charm of 
this part of the Hudson River Valley; and, moreover, it would 
produce a colossal ecological disruption.137 When concerned citizens 
first saw a proposed illustration for how the Project would 
effectively shave off a considerable portion of the mountain, they 
became energized and, in doing so, precipitated the modern 
                                                             
136. While between 1950 and 1960, the Company’s electricity sales only increased by 
under 10 million kilowatt hours, the increase exceeded that 10 million figure over the next 
decade. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 195. Talbot also explains how, after WWII, the rise of many 
New York City downtown office buildings changed the time when Con-Ed would need to ensure 
adequate capacity for high electric generation periods (peaking periods). The new buildings 
needed considerable electrical energy during the day, particularly during the summer when 
air conditioners were being run. The high peaking period had changed from the pre-war time-
frame (when high demand occurred at night with residential use). Id. at 68–69. And a project 
such as the Cornwall Project became possible after 1960, with the technological advance of 
reversible turbines—“machine[s] that can both pump water and be energized by the return 
flow.” Id.  at 73. Yet, as for pumped storage projects in general, Talbot aptly emphasizes that 
such projects simply store energy rather than provide additional baseload capacity:  
For every three units of electricity transferred to Storm King two units 
would be returned. Among the advantages of the project was that within 
three minutes it could provide energy for periods up to eleven hours in 
emergencies, for sale to other utilities, or as a supplement to the 
company’s New York City generators.  
Id. at 77. 
137. According to Lifset, the dynamic surrounding the project changed when Robert 
Boyle discovered how the project would adversely affect the striped bass—and in doing so, 
“brought the attention to the potential damage the plant would do to the Hudson River, and 
that argument employed the science of ecology to quantify that damage.” LIFSET, supra note 
131, at 78–79. No modern account of the Storm King fight would be complete without a nod to 
how saving the Hudson River Valley launched one of this nation’s foremost environmental 
champions, Richard Ottinger, who would serve in Congress and champion our environment’s 
cause as forcefully as any other member and who eventually would help establish Pace Law 
School as a premier environmental law school. Soon after he entered Congress, he introduced 
legislation that would place the area within a zone capable of being protected by the federal 
government and also removed the FPC’s ability to license the project. Id. at 124–29. His 
proposal prompted a parallel, yet less meaningful, effort from New York Governor Rockefeller 
(who may have felt threatened by how Congressman Ottinger had captured more currency as 
an environmental advocate), particularly as Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. was similarly 
planning to construct a facility in the Hudson Valley. James Ridgeway, Who Will Save the 
Hudson, and How?, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1965, at 10–11. 
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paradigm for environmental citizen engagement.138 Before the 
FPC, though, the citizens had little reason for optimism. The 
Commission’s acceptance of Con-Ed’s need for power overcame any 
meaningful interest in exploring alternative energy resources or 
the likely ecological or other adverse effects of the Project. The 
Commission even rejected an entreaty by the New York State 
Legislative Committee requesting that the Commission re-open its 
proceedings to address the ecological and scenic effects of the 
Project.139 As one of the lawyers involved in the lawsuit recently 
observed, “no FPC license for a hydroelectric plant had been 
successfully challenged on the merits, and there was little reason 
to be optimistic about a case where the central issue was a 
complaint that the Project would damage scenic beauty.”140 When, 
in March 1965, the Commission granted Con-Ed’s license 
application, the citizen group successfully sought a more friendly 
forum from the Second Circuit.141 
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s opinion on the fate of the Storm 
King project has since become a classic for both administrative and 
environmental law.142 To begin with, the citizen’s lawyers employed 
a successful strategy of focusing the court’s attention on what the 
Commission ignored: 
Scenic Hudson’s lawyers made a critically important 
strategic decision when they chose to focus on what the FPC 
had failed to consider and not on those topics that the 
commission did take into account. As a result, Scenic 
Hudson’s legal arguments began to focus on the impact of 
                                                             
138. Albert K. Butzel, Storm King Revisited: A View from the Mountaintop, 31 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 370, 374 (2014). 
139. Id. at 377; see also LIFSET, supra note 131, at 74–75. 
140. Butzel, supra note 138, at 372. The attorneys for the Project’s opponents included 
Dale Doty, a former FPC Commission who as a Commissioner had objected to another project 
on environmental grounds; he also served in the Department of the Interior. TALBOT, supra 
note 131, at 96–97; see Namekagon Hydro Co. v. F.P.C., 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954). Lloyd 
Garrison then joined to help craft the brief and argument before the Second Circuit. Butzel, 
supra note 138, at 378–79.  
 141. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
142. Id. 
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the plan on the ecology of the river (and the immediate 
environment). Aesthetic considerations, though still 
important, began to fade into the background. Because 
these ecological impacts could be studied, measured, and 
quantified, they strengthened opposition to the plant and 
made the FPC appear irresponsible for not considering all 
the evidence.143 
Issued within two months after the dramatic 1965 blackout in 
New York,144 the Second Circuit strongly rebuked the FPC. Judge 
Hayes began by noting how the case had attracted wide 
attention.145 He then opined that the Commission had not 
adequately compiled a sufficient administrative record to support 
its judgment, had not considered all the relevant issues, and had 
not examined other possible alternatives.146 Of considerable 
importance, the FPA charged the Commission with balancing the 
relevant factors for deciding whether to license a project—the list 
of factors included the area’s recreational and scenic value.147 That 
charge, according to Judge Hayes, affirmatively obligated the 
Commission to explore “and consider all relevant facts.”148 And in 
                                                             
143. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 93. The litigation strategy is explored by Butzel who 
participated in working on the Second Circuit appeal. Butzel, supra note 138; see also LIFSET, 
supra note 131, at 94–95 (describing Butzel’s background). 
144. See LIFSET, supra note 131, at 100. The company, after the blackout, announced 
that the blackout might have been averted had the Cornwall Project been operating. Butzel, 
supra note 138, at 380. 
145. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf., 354 F.2d at 612. 
146. Id. In particular, the court added that “[t]here is no doubt that the Commission 
is under a statutory duty to give full consideration to alternative plans.” Id. at 617. According 
to Judge Hayes, the administrative record lacked any “meaningful evidence which contradicts 
the proffered testimony supporting the gas turbine alternative.” Id. at 618. Indeed, Hayes 
continued, the Commission “exhibit[ed] a disregard of the statute and of judicial mandates 
instructing the Commission to probe all feasible alternatives.” Id. at 620. For instance, “[t]he 
Commission neither investigated [along with gas turbines] the use of interconnected power as 
a possible alternative . . . nor required Consolidated Edison to supply such information.” Id. at 
621. 
147. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 354 F.2d at 614. The Commission’s 1963 
regulations, as well as Namekagon Hydro Co. v. F.P.C., 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954), already 
confirmed the relevance of examining recreational and scenic values. Id. 
148. Id. at 620. 
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one of administrative law’s most memorable statements, he 
observed: 
     In this case, as in many others, the Commission has 
claimed to be the representative of the public interest. This 
role does not permit it to act as an umpire, blandly calling 
balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the 
right of the public must receive active and affirmative 
protection at the hands of the Commission.149 
Somewhat insensitively, and seemingly focused too much 
about the need for power rather than the environment, Con-Ed 
responded to the decision by suggesting it would continue pursuing 
its project and secure a license from the FPC on remand from the 
Second Circuit—although the project’s fate seemed sealed 
nonetheless.150 
                                                             
149. Id. 
150. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 101. The subsequent dynamic changed dramatically, 
with new lawyers (including the late environmental attorney David Sive), a new “liberal” CEO 
for Con-Ed (Charles Luce, a former Interior Department official, Wisconsin Law School 
Graduate, Yale fellow, and Justice Black clerk), additional studies, a potential change to make 
the project underground, as well as a greater emphasis on the possibly of constructing 
additional gas generating capacity rather than hydroelectric energy. The Commission’s 
administrative law judge issued a lengthy opinion entirely favoring Con-Ed, prompting New 
York City to object and force additional hearings (e.g., including an alternative site), but to no 
avail as the judge again accepted Con-Ed’s position—albeit suggesting that an alternative site 
would be licensable if a court rejected allowing development at Storm King. LIFSET, supra note 
131, at 107–129. While the Commission subsequently issued a second license to Con-Ed, that 
license would become overshadowed once Clean Water Act issues became injected into the 
dispute and the Commission became obligated to re-open its consideration of certain issues. 
LIFSET, supra note 131, at 151, 154–63, 168–69; see also Butzel, supra note 138, at 387. Before 
that would occur, however, the Second Circuit would issue its opinion in Scenic Hudson II, 
affirming the Commission—with a now famous dissent by Judge Oakes. Scenic Hudson Pres. 
Conference v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. 
Callaway, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974); Hudson River Fisherman’s Ass’n v. F.P.C., 498 F.2d 
827 (2d Cir. 1974). Justice Douglas would have accepted Judge Oakes’ reasoning, and further 
believed that the Commission had not complied with NEPA. Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference, 407 U.S. 926 (Douglas, J. from denial of certiorari). The Storm King proposal 
formally became shuttered at what is called the Hudson River Peace Treaty, involving Con-
Ed’s Indian Point nuclear reactors. LIFSET, supra note 131, at 183–84. For more information 
on this Peace Treaty, see ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 1–24 (1983). 
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Entering the 1970s, hydroelectric generation confronted the 
dialectic of those who believed that no new resource sites remained 
and those who were intent on removing already existing projects. 
In the searing report by Ralph Nader’s group, Vanishing Air, the 
authors dismissed hydroelectric power as limited by the lack of 
available water bodies.151 But it was the impact of hydroelectric 
power in cases like Storm King that undoubtedly chilled interest 
in new development. After all, President Carter had his federal hit 
list,152 and Storm King signaled a similar fate for any new federally 
licensed dams.153  The Commission attempted to avoid wading too 
far into this quagmire by diminishing its environmental function. 
Indeed, it unsuccessfully tried delegating compliance with the 
NEPA to the project licensees—an experiment that, by 1972, 
failed.154 Luckily for the Commission, it would be decades later 
before it would confront meaningful compliance with the 
Endangered Species Act—a more forceful program for addressing 
endangered and threatened species.155 But in the interim, many of 
the larger projects whose licenses were being considered for 
renewal would remain in limbo for decades, with the licensees 
                                                             
151. JOHN C. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR 
POLLUTION 94 (1970). 
152. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
153. Consequently, the heyday of developing dams, beginning around 1930, effectively 
ended around 1970. See Andrew H. Sawyer, Hydropower Relicensing in the Post Dam-Building 
Era, 11 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 12 (1996). 
154. In 1971, the Commission issued Order No. 415, implementing NEPA. That order 
required license applicants in contested applications to prepare their own environmental 
impact statement. In a case involving a transmission line not far from the Hudson, in Durham 
Valley, where even the licensee may have appreciated that the Commission’s approach 
violated the law, the Second Circuit held that the Commission could not “abdicate” its 
responsibility. Green Cty. Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 
1972). The court also issued an entreaty to the Commission that it had to review its regulations 
overall, to ensure that the policies of NEPA were being followed to the extent possible. Id. at 
417. The Commission generally exhibited reluctance for robustly applying NEPA. E.g., Ark. 
Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (natural gas 
curtailment plans).  
155. See Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 
F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (ESA compliance for annual license); see also Cal. Sportfishing Prot. 
All. v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2006) (ESA section 7 not apply to ongoing operations in 
this case). 
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operating on annual licenses.156 Later, with the eventual 
enactment of President Carter’s national energy plan and 
accompanying 1977 Department of Energy Organization Act, it 
would instead be the re-named Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, or “FERC,” that would confront these relicensing 
challenges.157  
IV. THE MODERN ERA FOR HYDROELECTRIC POWER 
For the past several decades, Congress, the judiciary, and the 
FERC, have considered and, in some cases, crafted several minor 
institutional tweaks to the Commission’s hydroelectric program. 
To begin with, during the 1980’s de-regulation efforts, the 
Commission became embroiled in a controversy over whether 
municipal entities should receive preference solely for new 
licenses, or during relicensing proceedings as well. At first, the 
Commission concluded that the preference would apply during 
Section 15 relicensing proceedings, a judgment affirmed by the 
Eleventh Circuit.158 Soon thereafter, though, the Commission 
changed its mind—a change then rejected by a D.C. Circuit panel 
opinion, and subsequently vacated in 1986 when the D.C. Circuit 
decided en banc, to resolve the issue.159 That en banc consideration 
became moot, when, in 1986, Congress resolved the debate by 
removing the preference at relicensing.160 Today, the Commission 
                                                             
156. E.g., City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (the city of 
Tacoma’s original license had expired in 1974, with a new license issued in 1998); Platte River 
Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust, 962 F.2d at 27 (noting 1970’s annual licenses 
for Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, and Nebraska Public Power would 
not be issued for many more years). 
157. See Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 
565 (1977). 
158. City of Bountiful, 11 FERC ¶ 61,337 (1980), aff’d, Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 685 
F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982). 
159. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 775 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
vacated, 787 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
160. Congress decided that, upon relicensing, removing the preference would “create[] 
a fair and competitive process under which a new license will be awarded to the applicant 
whose final proposal is best adapted to serve the public interest, taking into consideration on 
an equitable basis both non-power and power development values.” H.R. Rep. 99-507, supra 
note 100, at 10. See generally Daniel H. Cole, The Federal Power Act’s Controversial Municipal 
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continues to object to the idea of municipal preference—but it was 
recently told by the D.C. Circuit that the language of the FPA 
requires that it afford preference, unless a proposed project is not 
as well adapted as another.161 But in the ECPA of 1986, Congress 
also, among other changes, “clarifies and improves the 
Commission’s licensing process in assuring adequate 
environmental protections, while retaining the basic requirement 
that all projects, whenever licensed, be ‘best adapted to a 
comprehensive plan for developing a waterway or waterways.’”162 
Congress expressly charged the Commission with not only 
considering non-developmental values, but with ensuring that it 
afford “equal consideration” (changed from earlier language 
requiring “equitable treatment”) to those values, along with 
developmental and power purposes of the Act.163 After all, as 
Congress aptly observed, “relicensing is not to be the same as it is 
today.”164 The scrutiny must be greater. “Licenses issued in past 
years, must be re-examined and justified at relicensing in light of 
today’s standards and concerns.”165 
Moreover, some issues that dominated many older dialogues 
are no longer as salient as they once were. Indeed, while in the past 
many Commission decisions seemingly engaged in detailed 
analysis about the need for additional generation resources, that 
issue no longer enjoys much currency. The Commission today 
treats that issue, along with an inquiry into whether its proposed 
                                                             
Preference: The Merwin Dam Dispute and Legislative Proposals to Amend Federal Hydro-
Licensing Procedures, 7 ENERGY L. J. 373 (1986). 
161. W. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 806 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
162. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986); see also H.R. 
Rep. 99-507, supra note 100, at 10. Four years later, Congress again tweaked aspects of the 
hydroelectric program. Energy Policy Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (affecting charges to 
the licenses; clarifying the definition of a “fishway”; limiting eminent domain authority; 
affecting authorization grants along certain public lands; expanding the prohibition against 
licensing within National Park boundaries; and authorizing third-party agreements to fund 
the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA). 
163. 100 Stat. 1243 (1986); see also H.R. REP. 99-507, supra note 100 at 10. 
 164. H.R. REP. 99-507, supra note 100 at 33. 
165. Id. 
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terms and conditions for any relicense are too costly, as a matter 
for the licensee.166  
Other issues, instead, have become more prominent. On the 
economic side, for instance, they include whether the Commission 
should have required that all licensees, upon accepting a license, 
begin placing money into a decommissioning fund—to ensure the 
availability of monies if it is later determined that a dam ought to 
be removed.167 The Commission rejected that idea, however. And 
on the environmental side, for example, the Commission has 
wrestled with how section 401 of the Clean Water Act applies to 
new licenses, licensees seeking a relicense, and to licensees 
operating under an annual license (pursuant to section 15 of the 
FPA).168 A similar issues surfaces with the application of the 
Endangered Species Act, and in particular, how it applies to 
annual licensees or existing operating facilities whose license pre-
dated a listing or designation under the Act for species or habitat 
affected by the project.  
Yet one issue seemingly captivates most modern dialogues 
surrounding the Commission’s jurisdiction over hydroelectric 
projects. That issue is how the relicensing process has become 
cumbersome—and for some, how the process is effectively 
supplanted by other agencies’ jurisdiction under other statues, 
                                                             
166. City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
167. “The Commission will not generically impose decommissioning funding 
requirements on licenses.” Project Decommissioning at Relicensing; Policy Statement, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 339, 340 (Jan. 4, 1995); e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (FERC), FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR HYDROPOWER LICENSE: BEND HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, 
FERC PROJECT NO. 2643-001 at 89 (July 17, 1995), (rejecting recommendation for a 
decommissioning fund as part of licensee issuance). See generally Matthew D. Manahan & 
Sarah A. Verville, FERC and Dam Decommissioning, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 45 (2005) 
(discussing decommissioning); Michael A. Swiger et al., Paying For The Change: Can The 
FERC Force Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing?, 17 ENERGY L. J. 163 (1996); Beth C. 
Bryant, Comment, FERC’s Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power Act, 74 
WASH. L. REV. 95 (1999).  The Ninth Circuit has affirmed the Commission’s approach toward 
considering decommissioning. Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. FERC, 193 F. App’x 655, 659 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
168. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envt’l Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006) (application of 401 
upon relicensing); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson City. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) 
(application of CWA 401(d) at licensing); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. FERC, 313 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 
2002) (CWA 401 not apply at annual license). 
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such as the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species Act.169 For 
many years, the Commission explored changing its relicensing 
process, encouraging more collaboration among parties well before 
active Commission consideration. The objective would be to avoid 
having the purposes and policies from other statutory programs be 
considered too late in the process. The Department of Interior, for 
instance, commented how: 
Administrative reforms of the past several years have 
achieved real improvements. However, past reform efforts 
have occurred within the existing licensing framework, i.e., 
the traditional process and the alternative licensing process 
(ALP). The Department believes that a new licensing 
process should be thorough and flexible enough to supplant 
both of these existing processes, as well as the hybrid 
process.170 
By 2003, the Commission responded by adopting an 
“integrated licensing process” (ILP).171 The ILP is designed to front-
load as much as possible into the process, and provide the ability 
to identify and address concurrently particular issues for a licensed 
project. 
Congress has since modified, albeit only slightly, the 
hydroelectric program in a few ways. First, in 2005, following years 
of lobbying, Congress amended Part 1 of the FPA to respond to the 
industry’s concern about federal agencies conditioning authority 
under sections 4(e) and 18 of the Act. This amendment granted 
licensees a right to a trial-type hearing on those disputed issues of 
material fact that an agency may have relied upon when issuing 
                                                             
169. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, supra note 6, at 81; Charles R. 
Sensiba, Comment, Who’s in Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 603 (1999). 
170. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to FERC (Dec. 6, 2002) (on file with author). 
171. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING UNDER THE 
FEDERAL POWER ACT, ORDER NO. 2002, AND ORDER NO. 2002-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,037 (2004); 
see generally Part VII, Chapter 40, Hydroelectric Regulation Under the Federal Power Act, in 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (Amy K. Kelly, 3d Ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2016) 
(thorough presentation of the Commission’s current practice and implementation of the Act). 
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mandatory conditions or prescriptions.172 The amendment further 
required that section 18 fishway prescriptions include a 
consideration of development as well as non-developmental 
values.173 Additionally, licensees, or other parties, could now 
propose alternative prescriptions, which Congress anticipated 
would be accepted  if they are equally as protective as the agency’s 
proposed prescription and either cheaper or more efficient.174 
Second, Congress responded to various efforts designed to promote 
small hydroelectric projects by passing the Hydroelectric 
Regulatory Efficiency Act,175 and the Bureau of Reclamation Small 
Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act.176 These 
two acts seek to facilitate the regulatory review process for small, 
private projects and Bureau of Reclamation hydroelectric projects. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our modern electric grid has evolved considerably since the 
1920s. But harnessing and promoting hydroelectric generation is 
what served as the impetus for the federal government’s first foray 
                                                             
 172. Regulation of the Development of Water Power and Resources, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) 
(2005). The services need not conduct their own environmental analysis when submitting terms and 
conditions. See Umpqua Valley Audubon Soc’y v. FERC, 149 F. App’x 598 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 173. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005). 
174. Industry responded swiftly; and, in 2005, the licensee for the Box Canyon Project 
urged that the Commission either require the other federal agencies to develop implementing 
rules immediately or provide a right to a hearing before the Commission. Request for 
Rehearing; Request to Reopen the Record; Motion to Amend; Motion for Stay; and Request to 
Defer Consideration of Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, Washington, Public 
Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, Wash. (Box Canyon Hydroelectric Project, Project 
No. 2042-103, at 182 (Aug. 2005) (“a trial-type hearing before the Commission regarding the 
disputed issues of material fact relevant to the mandatory conditions and prescriptions is 
absolutely required unless the District receives a fair opportunity to avail itself of the 
procedural process provisions in Section 241 of the 2005 EPA.”) (on file with author). The 
agencies developed interim rules by the end of the year. Resource Agency Procedures for 
Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydropower Licenses; Interim Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,803 
(Nov. 17, 2005). These rules have since been modified. 
175. Hydropower regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493 
(2013). 
176. Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs 
Act, Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498 (2013). See generally Regina Cline, Hydropower in U.S. 
Gets Boost From New Laws. Will Congress Do More?, BNA ENERGY & EVT. BLOG (Jan. 30, 
2014), http://www.bna.com/hydropower-us-gets-b17179881735/.  For a discussion of these new 
authorities, see Warren, supra note 6, at 955–71. 
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into the energy regulatory space. The 1920 FWPA, in short, began 
the trajectory of energy policy that has since carried energy policy 
into the wider dialogue about how to deliver efficiently cheap 
electricity in an environmentally sound manner. As FERC 
considers the Klamath Dam removal agreement, hydroelectric 
generation will remain an important part of our ongoing energy 
conversations. And, as these conversations unfold, the arc of how 
we have arrived at our current juncture in our nation’s energy 
policy history is worth recalling. After all, as this historical arc 
illustrates, the 1920s legislation emerged out of conservation-era 
conversations, and the current dialogue about resources and 
environmental threats similarly animates and envelops present 
concerns about energy resources. Even more telling, perhaps, is 
that in 1920, Congress believed that states and the federal 
government could share regulatory space; today, those 
conversations continue, and quite possibly require revisiting 
fundamental historical assumptions.  
